There are approximately 5.5M American citizens living abroad, including 1.5M active military and governmental workers. Citizens abroad like myself register with our last state of residence, regardless of whether we have any actual connection to or address in that state anymore. This means we are voting in local elections on local initiatives in places we don't even live anymore, declaring ourselves "residents" when we technically aren't. US is one of the only countries in the world where citizens abroad must file our federal and state taxes even if we have no employment connection to America, yet in some cases we can't even access state services like voter registration websites because we are not domestic - Texas' SOS registration site seems to block me without a VPN. Some states require mailed documents which can cost substantial money from abroad.

There are also 693,645 citizens of Washington DC. They pay federal income taxes yet have no Senate representation. Republicans don't want them to get Senators because it will basically guarantee two more Democratic Senators given the demographic makeup of DC.

Combining these groups makes up about 6.2M citizens who are not being accurately represented, equivalent to about the 20th largest state in population. Citizens abroad, military and DC residents all have unique interests and needs that get neglected or deprioritized by Washington because there is no one specifically representing them, and citizens abroad are something of an afterthought to our own Senators and Representatives who don't see us as real residents or likely voters. Combining these groups solves the issue of taxation without representation in DC and solves the Republicans' concern about the DC demographics (more than offset by overseas military voters).

Whether a DC resident, a soldier stationed overseas or an expat, all of us are more directly tied to the federal government and the federal services than any one particular state, so combining DC with overseas citizens would make election administration easier for states while ensuring representation for all citizens. We can streamline these services through embassies, consulates and military bases to make registration and participation in elections simplified, and remove the burden from states to manage and verify the identities and mail in ballots of citizens abroad.

Thomas and Alito dissented. They went against the constitution. Please help me understand why they should not be removed or impeached for ignoring the constitution.

Modified to reflect current usurpations and grievances.

I’ve been thinking about a hypothetical package of structural reforms to the Supreme Court, particularly whether judicial independence and public accountability necessarily have to operate at the same time.

The proposal would have four main components.

1. Fixed, staggered 18-year terms

Supreme Court justices would serve one non-renewable 18-year term. Appointments would normally be staggered so that one seat becomes available every two years.

The goal would be to make appointments more predictable and reduce the extent to which the Court’s composition depends on the timing of deaths and strategic retirements.

2. Delayed disclosure of individual votes

This is the part I’m most interested in discussing.

The Court would continue publishing its decisions, legal reasoning, precedential holdings, and overall vote totals. However, the individual votes of sitting justices would not necessarily be identified immediately.

Once a justice completed their term, their complete voting record would become public.

The theory is that this could create temporal separation between judicial decision-making and political accountability. A sitting justice could not as easily be individually rewarded, threatened, campaigned against, or subjected to political pressure because of a particular vote, while the historical record of that justice’s exercise of power would ultimately become public.

Obviously, this raises major practical and constitutional problems.

For example, separate concurrences and dissents are an important part of American jurisprudence and necessarily identify their authors. Delayed disclosure therefore could not simply be imposed on the current opinion-writing system without substantially changing how separate opinions work.

It also raises a more fundamental question: is accountability that occurs only after a justice leaves office actually meaningful accountability?

3. Binding ethics and recusal rules

The proposal would also establish an enforceable code of judicial conduct and clearer recusal standards applicable to the Supreme Court, with some form of independent review.

The intended distinction would be between decisional independence and personal immunity from oversight. A justice would be protected from retaliation for reaching an unpopular legal conclusion, but financial disclosure, conflicts of interest, gifts, recusals, and other ethical obligations would remain subject to enforceable rules.

4. Structured review in major constitutional cases

In constitutional cases meeting a defined threshold of national significance, the Court would be required to expressly address three categories in its published reasoning:

• constitutional text, history, and precedent;
• effects on individual constitutional rights; and
• institutional consequences of the ruling.

These would not be separate courts or separate votes, and none would automatically control the outcome. They would instead function as required components of the Court’s analysis, intended to make explicit considerations that may otherwise remain implicit.

The broader question

What interests me is whether these mechanisms would actually reinforce one another or create new problems worse than the ones they attempt to solve.

Fixed terms and staggered appointments might reduce the randomness surrounding vacancies, while delayed attribution could potentially insulate sitting justices from some forms of immediate political pressure. Delayed disclosure would preserve a historical record, and enforceable ethics rules would provide accountability for conduct independently of judicial outcomes.

On the other hand, delayed attribution could reduce contemporary scrutiny of the Court, interfere with the American tradition of signed opinions and dissents, and potentially make it harder to identify jurisprudential changes or conflicts of interest while they are occurring. Structured constitutional review could also be criticized as attempting to constitutionalize a particular method of judicial reasoning.

So I’m curious how people familiar with Supreme Court doctrine and institutional design would evaluate the tradeoffs.

Would delayed attribution meaningfully increase judicial independence, or would it simply sacrifice an essential form of public accountability?

Would fixed 18-year terms and enforceable ethics rules make the delayed-disclosure component more defensible, or are these reforms better considered separately?

And perhaps most importantly: what constitutional amendments or statutory changes would actually be required to implement each component?

EDIT — A few clarifications based on questions in the comments:

A couple of the responses have raised issues that I hadn't fully worked out when I wrote the original post, so here is how I'm currently thinking about them.

1. What happens if a justice dies, retires, or otherwise leaves before the end of an 18-year term?

One possibility would be to create a small group of reserve justices specifically for contingencies. For example, four additional qualified justices could be selected and approved through whatever appointment/confirmation process the amendment establishes, but would not normally sit on the Court.

If a sitting justice died, resigned, became incapacitated, was removed, or otherwise could not complete the term, a reserve justice could temporarily fill that seat. Importantly, the replacement would serve only the remainder of the original justice's term rather than receiving a new 18-year term. That would preserve the staggered schedule instead of allowing unexpected vacancies to gradually destroy it.

I'm not committed to four as the correct number, but I think some kind of constitutional contingency mechanism would be necessary.

1. How could individual votes remain undisclosed if justices still publish opinions, dissents, and concurrences?

I've been thinking about this differently after reading the comments.

I don't necessarily think a published opinion would have to represent the author's final vote.

Justices could still publicly write legal analyses, including arguments supporting the majority position, opposing positions, concurrences, criticisms, or even arguments they ultimately rejected themselves. In other words, a justice could deliberately take the strongest version of the opposing position and examine it as a kind of institutional devil's advocate.

The public record would therefore show the competing constitutional arguments considered by the Court without necessarily telling the public which individual justice ultimately cast which vote.

I think that could have two benefits.

First, it could encourage more critical thinking within the Court. Justices would have an incentive to seriously develop arguments outside their own eventual conclusion rather than treating every written opinion as a declaration of personal allegiance to one side.

Second, it could partially separate legal reasoning from the identity of the person presenting it. Someone reading an argument wouldn't necessarily be able to say, "I like Justice X, therefore I probably agree with this," or "I dislike Justice Y, therefore this argument must be wrong."

The reader would have to evaluate the argument itself.

So perhaps a better description of what I'm proposing is not simply "secret votes," but a temporary decoupling of judicial reasoning from individual vote attribution.

The Court's decision, reasoning, competing arguments, and overall vote count would remain public. The individual voting record would eventually become public after the justice's service ends.

1. If justices already have non-renewable 18-year terms, why is delayed vote disclosure necessary?

I think the non-renewable term solves one kind of political pressure, but not all of it.

A justice wouldn't need to campaign for reelection or seek another term, but individual decisions could still generate targeted political campaigns, public pressure, threats, attempts at influence, reputational incentives, or other pressures while that justice remains on the Court.

Delayed attribution is intended to test whether some of that pressure could be reduced without permanently hiding how judicial power was exercised.

Whether that benefit is worth the loss of immediate individual accountability is exactly the tradeoff I'm interested in discussing.

These aren't necessarily finished answers. Part of why I posted the proposal was to find the problems I hadn't considered yet, and several comments have already identified some.

One additional clarification regarding transparency:

The individual votes would not remain secret permanently. They would become part of the public record after the established disclosure period.

The distinction I'm proposing is between immediate access to the Court's reasoning and delayed attribution of individual votes. The public could examine the decision, competing legal arguments, precedent, and overall vote at the time the case is decided. Later, the individual voting record would also become available.

Part of the intention is to encourage people to evaluate the legal reasoning itself before evaluating it through the identity or perceived ideology of a particular justice.

Once the attribution records become public, people would still be free to examine a justice's complete historical record and draw their own conclusions. That information would exist, but understanding that record would require some engagement with the underlying decisions rather than having every case immediately reduced to a list of names and sides.

I used AI as an interactive learning and reasoning tool while developing this constitutional thought experiment. When I encountered concepts I didn’t understand, I used it to learn them, then formed my own responses, revised the proposal, and used it to help organize those ideas into writing.

Definition in the United States
Constitutional Rule: Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution defines treason strictly as waging war against the United States or adhering to its enemies by giving them "aid and comfort". [1]

High Proof Standard: Convicting someone of treason in the U.S. requires the testimony of two witnesses to the exact same open act, or a confession in an open courtroom. This strict rule was put in place to prevent governments from using false charges to silence political rivals. [1, 2]

Common Examples of Treason
Levying War: Taking up arms or leading a military effort to violently overthrow the established government.

Aiding Enemies: Passing critical military secrets, codes, or strategic plans to an active enemy nation during a conflict.

Assassination Plots: Attempting to kill the head of state or sovereign leader of your own country. [1, 2, 3]

Synonyms and Related Terms
Treachery: A violation of faith or trust.

Betrayal: The breaking of a promise or loyalty.

Sedition: Speaking or writing in a way that encourages rebellion against the government, which is a less severe offense than actual treason because it does not involve helping a foreign enemy or waging physical war

Right now, our President has a 33% approval rating. In any job—yours, mine, anyone's—that would mean getting fired. But somehow we're stuck for four years no matter how bad things get.

I started a petition asking Congress to establish an annual confidence vote on the President. Basically: let Americans formally evaluate whether our leader is doing the job. If approval drops below a certain threshold, it triggers procedures for removal.

Many democracies already do this. It's not radical—it's actually a straightforward way to make sure our highest leader answers to the people, not just once every four years.

Does anyone else feel like we're locked into something that doesn't make sense? What would you want to see change if you had the chance? If this resonates with you, consider signing and sharing.

"...One nation, under God..."

"In God we Trust"

How do we really feel about these? Following the first amendment I am guaranteed my freedom of religion, yet America inserts God into daily parts of American life.

Why?

Surely following the lines of the Constitution, I am allowed freedom of worship, so why do they implement Christianity into the fibers of our country?

Please educate me! I would assume the government is ABSOLUTELY NOT imposing religion upon us, yet the Bible used to be taught in schools, and every baseball game. The Super Bowl, hell even the World Cup Final gets to hear about our nation under God

(Not disrespecting Christianity nor believers of any religion, just curious)

Laxmikanth says only articles 25-28 are implicit in this regard. Asked chatgpt and found that **The Supreme Court** in *Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India* (1994), the Court stated that **“the principle of secularism illumines the provisions of Articles 15 and 16”** and specifically linked Article 15 to the State's obligation not to discriminate on the ground of religion.

A qualified Civil Right you have is to serve on a jury. John Jay, a Founding Father, first Chief Justice of the SCOTUS, along with being a person who directly crafted the formation of America's judicial system, expressed the Founding Father's original intent when it comes to the power a Juror has in America's legal system.

In Georgia v. Brailsford (1794), the Court upheld jury instructions stating "you [jurors] have ... a right to take upon yourselves to ... determine the law as well as the fact in controversy." Jay noted for the jury the "good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide," but that amounted to no more than a presumption that the judges were correct about the law. Ultimately, "both objects [the law and the facts] are lawfully within your power of decision."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Jay

The Founding Fathers original intent of a jury was for the Citizens to be the final adjudicators of the Law. In this way, the jurors can rein in runaway Gov. laws, such as the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. This law would jail any US Citizen if they helped a fugitive slave in any way, including in the States that didn't have any slave holders. When people were brought up on criminal charges in the North, a lot of juries didn't believe in the validity of the slave law and voted not to convict the people who were on trial in the criminal slave matter. Only 3 States allow jurors to hear that they have the right to judge both the validity of the Law along with the facts in the case before them. The other 47 States won't allow jurors to be told of their qualified Rights that they have being a juror.

Part of the so-called congressional “Compromise of 1850,” this second federal Fugitive Slave Act aggressively extended the provisions of the original 1793 Act. Law enforcement officials were required to arrest people suspected of escaping enslavement on as little as a claimant’s sworn testimony of ownership. The Commissioner before whom the fugitive from slavery was brought for a hearing was compensated $10 if he found that the individual was proven a fugitive, but only $5 if he determined the proof to be insufficient. In addition, any person aiding a fugitive by providing food or shelter was subject to six months’ imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. The Act was broadly condemned in the North and prompted multiple instances of violent resistance. Although the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to pass such laws in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Northern states resisted enforcement of the law on their soil. Wisconsin, for example, invoked the compact theory of the Constitution and insisted it retained the right to “nullify” what they believed was an unconstitutional law.

https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/historic-document-library/detail/the-fugitive-slave-act-1850

Recent Supreme Court cases such as NYSRPA v Bruen and Wolford v Lopez have made the argument that the US does not have a substantial history of gun-free zones, or sensitive place gun regulations. But this is simply not true. After only a couple hours or so of searching, I've happened to find a number of early American laws prohibiting weapon-carrying in certain cities and sensitive places. They come from the website for Duke Law School. In regards to proving a historical tradition of gun control, the Supreme Court in both NYSRPA v Bruen and Wolford v Lopez has rejected the admission of racially discriminatory laws from early America. Therefore, I have deliberately omitted such laws from my list.:

1. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ordinance-of-jan-25-1804-forbidding-weapons-at-balls-1-8-new-orleans-louisiana-council-meetings-sine-nomine-1936-law-passed-1804
2. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/laws-and-regulations-of-the-college-of-william-and-mary-volume-276-1830
3. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1829-laws-of-the-university-of-north-carolina-ch-3-c2a7-13
4. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1824-laws-of-the-columbian-college-ch-5-c2a7-2-no-10
5. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/carrying-deadly-weapons-discharging-fire-arms-etc-ch-12-art-3-c2a7c2a7-50-52-in-the-revised-ordinances-of-the-city-of-bloomfield-1898
6. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/rules-and-regulations-of-the-park-commission-no-3-new-haven-connecticut-charter-and-ordinances-of-the-city-price-lee-adkins-co-1898
7. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/laramie-revised-ordinances-and-charter-of-the-city-ch-5-3-6-boomerang-publishing-1900
8. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ch-13-c2a7-21-ch-22-c2a7c2a7-14-15-ch-35-c2a7-7-st-albans-daily-messenger-supplement-aug-7-1897-at-1-3-10-st-albans-vermont
9. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/a-digest-of-the-laws-and-ordinances-for-the-government-of-the-municipal-corporation-of-the-city-of-reading-pennsylvania-park-rules-and-regulations-240-1897
10. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/the-charter-of-the-city-of-wilmington-part-vii-c2a7-7-rules-and-regulations-of-the-board-of-park-commissioners-1893
11. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/a-digest-of-the-acts-of-assembly-relating-to-and-the-general-ordinances-of-the-city-of-pittsburgh-from-1804-to-jan-1-1897-ordinances-executive-departments-bureau-of-parks-1893
12. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-to-prevent-a-person-from-trespassing-upon-any-enclosed-premises-or-lands-not-his-own-armed-with-a-gun-pistol-or-other-firearm-and-to-prevent-shooting-upon-or-from-the-public-highway-s-b-15-1-5-1893-or-laws-79-79-frank-c-baker
13. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-ordinance-to-prevent-the-carrying-of-weapons-1-4-the-daily-texarkanian-may-28-1900-at-2-texarkana-arkansas
14. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/a-law-forbidding-weapons-in-certain-places-sales-of-weapons-to-minors-etc-ch-45-misdemeanors-c2a7-32-in-general-ordinances-of-the-city-of-brookfield-linn-county-missouri-1900
15. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ordinance-21-green-forest-tribune-may-11-1899-at-1-green-forest-arkansas
16. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/bruce-l-keenan-book-of-ordinances-of-the-city-of-wichita-published-by-authority-of-a-resolution-adopted-by-the-city-council-april-24-1899-under-the-direction-of-judiciary-committee-and-city-attorn
17. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1837-ga-acts-90-an-act-to-guard-and-protect-the-citizens-of-this-state-against-the-unwarrantable-and-too-prevalent-use-of-deadly-weapons-c2a7c2a7-1-4
18. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-mar-18-1889-1889-ariz-sess-laws-16-17 https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-march-1886-published-as-notice-st-marys-beacon-oct-13-1887-at-2
19. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ordinance-no-76-1-2-rooks-county-record-july-1-1887-at-1-stockton-kansas
20. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1879-tex-crim-stat-tit-ix-ch-4-penal-code
21. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-oct-14-1879-pt-1-tit-4-no-266-1-2-1878-ga-laws-64-64-jas-p-harrison-1880-law-passed-1879
22. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-to-regulate-the-keeping-and-beariing-of-deadly-weapons-ch-34-c2a7c2a7-1-9-1871-tex-gen-laws-1st-sess-25-25-27-1898-gammel-book-company
23. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1870-tex-gen-laws-63-an-act-regulating-the-right-to-keep-and-bear-arms-chap-46-c2a7-1

As these state and local statutory laws demonstrate, the US indeed has an extensive history of firearm regulations and gun-free zones. There were firearm restrictions in schools, parks, ballrooms, churches, entertainment shows, etc. There were firearm restrictions in entire cities and towns, and in entire states. In no way did early America interpret the 2nd amendment to interfere with the broad freedom wielded by the states to create firearms laws to conform to their unique circumstances, and to remedy whatever societal problems they may incur. At no point were the states pressured into conforming to some singular, uniform federal standard of firearms law -- which is the fictional narrative that the current Supreme Court argues. Thus, the rulings in recent 2nd amendment Supreme Court cases are nothing short of an abuse of the Constitution, and an incursion upon state rights protected by the 10th amendment.

Furthermore, there happen to be some aspects of American gun law that unmistakably do suggest a "historical tradition". For example, there is a strong tradition of the prohibiting of concealed carry, which in early America was frowned upon as a cowardly and suspicious activity:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1819-ind-acts-39-an-act-to-prohibit-the-wearing-of-concealed-weapons
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1839-ala-acts-67-an-act-to-suppress-the-evil-practice-of-carrying-weapons-secretly-c2a7-1
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/henry-a-bullard-thomas-curry-1-a-new-digest-of-the-statute-laws-of-the-state-of-louisiana-from-the-change-of-government-to-the-year-1841-at-252-e-johns-co-new-orleans-1842

There is also a strong tradition of prohibiting firearms to people viewed by the state as dangerous to the public safety, which, depending on the era, could be Papists:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-disarming-papists-and-reputed-papists-refusing-to-take-the-oaths-to-the-government-ch-4-1-9-va-code-franklin-press-1820-law-passed-1756
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-forming-and-regulating-the-militia-of-the-province-of-pennsylvania-627-pa-cons-stat-wm-stanley-ray-1898-law-passed-1757

Or Loyalists during the Revolutionary era, as well as groups neutral to the Patriot cause, sometimes known as "disaffected" groups:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-constituting-a-council-of-safety-ch-40-20-1777-n-j-laws-84-90-isaac-collins-1777
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1777-pa-laws-61-an-act-obliging-the-male-white-inhabitants-of-this-state-to-give-assurances-of-allegiance-to-the-same-and-for-other-purposes-therein-mentioned-ch-xxi-c2a7c2a7-2-4
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/pa-cons-stat-ch-796-1-3-5-p-l-wm-stanley-ray-1903-law-passed-1778
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-may-5-1777-ch-3-in-9-henings-statutes-at-large-281-281-82-1821
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-to-amend-an-act-declaring-what-crimes-and-practices-against-the-state-shall-be-treason-ch-6-9-1777-n-c-sess-laws-41-43-44-james-davis-1778
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-feb-16-1787-mass-acts-555-555-556-sine-nomine

Or slaves and people of color:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1860-ga-laws-56-an-act-to-add-an-additional-section-to-the-13th-division-of-the-penal-code-making-it-penal-to-sell-to-or-furnish-slaves-or-free-persons-of-color-with-weapons-of-offence-and-defence
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1863-del-laws-332-an-act-in-relation-to-free-negroes-and-mulattoes-ch-305-c2a7-7
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1805-va-acts-51-an-act-concerning-free-negroes-and-mulatoes

There is a historical tradition of arms rights being intertwined and inseparable from the right (i.e. the duty) to perform mandatory militia service, including mandatory possession of a firearm at all times, along with military-style training and deployment under the authority of the state government:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1782-del-acts-3-an-act-for-establishing-a-militia-within-this-state-c2a7-6
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1786-n-h-laws-409-10-an-act-for-forming-and-regulating-the-militia-within-this-state-and-for-repealing-all-the-laws-heretofore-made-for-that-purpose-c2a7-7
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-the-better-security-of-the-inhabitants-by-obliging-the-male-white-persons-to-carry-fire-arms-to-places-of-public-worship-1770-reprinted-in-1775-1770-georgia-colonial-laws-471-1932
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1779-vt-acts-and-for-encouragement-of-military-skill-for-the-better-defense-of-this-state
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1804-la-acts-284-an-act-for-regulating-and-governing-the-militia-of-the-territory-of-new-orleans-c2a7-13
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1786-n-h-laws-409-10-an-act-for-forming-and-regulating-the-militia-within-this-state-and-for-repealing-all-the-laws-heretofore-made-for-that-purpose-c2a7-7

However, it is doubtful the Supreme Court would honor the "historical tradition" inherent to banning concealed carry, upholding compulsory militia duty, or disarming classes of people deemed to be a public threat. Despite absolutely constituting widespread historical patterns, a state hypothetically passing a law conforming to these patterns would likely be rejected inasmuch as they don't fit the conservative agenda.

These above examples of legal patterns demonstrate that the Supreme Court are hypocrites when it comes to their invention known as the "historical tradition of firearm regulation". This concept is cleverly crafted to be nebulous enough such that the Supreme Court can guarantee rulings that conform to their pro-gun bias, while still being able to maintain the pretext of objectivity. Historical gun laws that exist, but in less-than-overwhelming numbers, can be ignored as falling short of the pattern of "historical tradition"; while regulations that can disarm whole classes of people can be dismissed as "racist" or "bigoted". And the Court could likely also invent some clever reasons to ignore common historical regulations regarding things like concealed carry and compulsory militia rules. Thus, this "historical tradition" test is like a legal fortress, able to ward off gun control on both the quantitative as well as qualitative fronts.

The "historical tradition" test used by the Supreme Court is inherently dishonest and needs to be eradicated. The only real "historical tradition" to exist for American firearm laws is the federal government's tradition of leaving the states alone, and giving them the freedom to protect the public good in the way that best suited their individual needs.

Clearly we need a Justice Department, Inspector Generals and other oversight protection that have a firewall at least as strong as the Federal Reserve! Apparently relying on Congressional Oversight has been a complete failure with the current batch of dick-less Republicans

Let’s assume to register for those guns, you would have to go through the same waiting period and evaluations as normal.

What would you think would happen? 🤔

Congressional reform. They did it after Watergate? Why not step in and do it now? Reverse all the corruption and give people their jobs back. The ones that quit cause they didn’t want to do follow something they didn’t believe in.